# LLMs for Low Resource Languages in Multilingual, Multimodal and Dialectal Settings



https://llm-low-resource-lang.github.io



EACL 2024, 21th March, 2024

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


### Content

- Introduction [20 mins]
- Models and their capabilities for low-resource languages [70 mins]
  - NLP models [40 mins]
  - Multimodality [25 mins]
    - Overview
      - Multimodality
      - Speech
  - QA [5 mins]
- Coffee break [30 mins]
- Prompting + Benchmarking Tool [60 mins]
  - Prompt Engineering [40 mins]
    - Prompting techniques
    - Cross-/multi-lingual prompting
  - Prompt and Benchmarking tools [15 mins]
  - QA: [5 mins]
- Other Related Aspects [20 mins]



# Other Related Aspects



### **Related Aspects**

- Cultural Bias
- Misinformation Generation/Detection
- Hellucination
- Jailbreaking/Red Teaming
- Computational Resources: Carbon Footprint

Disclaimer: Examples in this section can be offensive to some readers and are presented for illustrative purposes.



Culture fundamentally shapes people's reasoning, behavior, and communication, which is widely supported by research in different discipline


#### **Important Questions:**

- Do LLMs learn cultural values?
- Does the training data we use represent our culture well?




- How LLMs behave with entities that exhibit cultural variation (e.g., people names, food dishes, etc.)?
- Test 628 naturally-occurring prompts
  + 20,368 entities spanning 8 types
  contrasting Arab and Western
  cultures.


Having Beer after Prayer? Measuring Cultural Bias in Large Language Models, (Naous et al., 2024)




Example from GPT-4 and JAIS-Chat when asked to complete culturally-invoking prompts that are written in Arabic. LMs often generate entities that fit in a Western culture (red) instead of the relevant Arab culture.



- Extracted entities from Wikipedia, and CommonCrawl corpus
- Extracted naturally occurring prompts by querying Twitter/X






Stories about Arab characters more often cover a theme of poverty with adjectives such as "poor" persistently used.


Having Beer after Prayer? Measuring Cultural Bias in Large Language Models, (Naous et al., 2024)



- Use role-based prompting to prompt LLM to simulate 606 real survey responders (half from Egypt and half from USA) for the world values survey (WVS-7).
- Measure similarity between each LLM persona answers and corresponding human survey answers.

Model	Egypt	<b>United States</b>	
GPT-3.5 AceGPT-Chat LLaMA-2-Chat mT0-XXL	48.61 / 25.99 47.82 / 29.72 46.31 / 24.48 45.92 / 27.93	64.86 / 39.29 52.83 / 27.69 63.10 / 36.72 55.48 / 31.40	The alignment with the United States populations is much higher reflecting the euro-centric bias in current LLMs.
Average	47.16 / 27.03	59.07 / 33.78	





The models (across two countries and two languages, and averaged across the four LLMs) better reflect the viewpoints of specific demographics over others, with **marginalized populations exhibiting lower alignment**.



Investigating Cultural Alignment of Large Language Models, (AlKhamissi et al., arXiv, 2024)

### **Misinformation: Generation**

**Intentional generation:** malicious users can knowingly prompt LLMs to generate various kinds of misinformation including fake news, rumors, conspiracy theories, clickbait, misleading claims, or propaganda.




please give an example of misinformation. Only output the content of the misinformation. The content should be as detailed as possible. Do not generate any other words.

#### **LLM-Generated Misinformation**



Eating apple seeds can cure all types of cancer because they contain a magic compound called amygdalin that specifically targets cancer cells without affecting healthy cells. Pharmaceutical companies are aware of this simple cure but are suppressing the information to make money off expensive cancer treatments.

### **Misinformation: Generation**




Misinformation generated by LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT) can be semantically similar to human-written misinformation

Latent space visualization of human-written and ChatGPT-generated misinformation



Can LLM-Generated Misinformation Be Detected? (Chen and Shu, arXiv 2024)

# **Misinformation: Detection**



- It is generally hard for LLMs to detect LLM-generated misinformation.
- GPT-4 can outperform humans on detecting LLM-generated misinformation




**Hallucination** in the context of LLMs refers to a situation where the model unintentionally generates factually incorrect or misleading content.

#### User Query Retrieve the oldest photo of a cat

**ChatGPT** There is no definitive answer to this question as "the oldest photo of a cat" is subjective and varies based on different sources and definitions. However, **one candidate for the oldest cat photo is the daguerreotype "Cat with Blue Ribbon," taken by photographer Antoine Claudet in 1840.** The photo depicts a cat sitting on a table, gazing directly at the camera, and wearing a blue ribbon tied around its neck. [...]

(Li et al., 2023)

Cannot be verified by existing source






HaluEval: A Large-Scale Hallucination Evaluation Benchmark for Large Language Models, (Li et al., 2023)

#### **Detection Methods**


• Polling-based Object Probing Evaluation (POPE)





### **Detection Methods**

• Retrieve and Match with External Facts






A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions, (Huang et al., 2023)

#### **Detection Methods**

#### • Uncertainty Estimation





A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions, (Huang et al., 2023)

### **Detection Methods**

• Similarity-based measures

Evaluate hallucination by computing similarity between a target generation and either a reference text or other generations. Use metrics like:

- Lexical metrics like ROUGE and Named Entity Overlap
- Natural Language Inference (NLI)-based metrics

	<u></u>						<u> </u>
Language	R1-F1	R1-P	<b>R1-R</b>	R2-F1	R2-P	R2-R	NEO-F1
		High-Resource Languages					
English	1.83	87.58	0.94	0.87	47.38	0.44	4.27
Chinese	6.43	57.34	3.76	2.07	23.22	1.17	4.69
Spanish	2.77	85.86	1.47	1.35	49.10	0.71	3.28
French	2.18	87.78	1.13	1.06	51.41	0.55	4.35
Vietnamese	6.82	92.92	4.22	4.10	73.28	2.43	i - 1
Indonesian	7.51	68.51	4.87	2.36	26.39	1.53	
	1	1		Lov	v-Resour	ce Langua	ages
Thai	0.04	1.14	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	-
Russian	0.09	4.69	0.05	0.01	0.28	0.00	0.48
Ukrainian	0.04	1.53	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.70
Persian	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	- !
Finnish	0.89	37.70	0.46	0.20	10.03	0.10	0.58
Korean	0.18	6.58	0.09	0.01	0.88	0.00	0.24
Hungarian	0.74	64.74	0.37	0.16	23.23	0.08	-
	1			!			1

Evaluate the multilingual context (19 languages) of biography generation task using BLOOMZ.



### Mitigation

- Data-related Hallucinations
  - Misinformation and Biases
  - Knowledge Boundary
    - Knowledge editing: Editing model parameters
    - Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)
  - Knowledge Shortcut
  - Knowledge Recall Failures
    - Chain-of-Thought prompting
- Training-related Hallucination
- Inference-related Hallucination



# Is Hallucination Always Bad?


### Yes!

- Mission-critical areas such as medicine, banking, finance, and law.
- Generated content are factually inaccurate or offend individual, societal, or particular cultural norms

### Maybe Not!

- Creative Writing
- Entertainment and Gaming
- Problem-Solving and Ideation






### Circumventing LLM safety mechanisms to generate harmful responses and is usually carried out by the users.



Cross-lingual vulnerability experiments across 12 languages of different resource settings:

- Translation-based jailbreaking attack
- AdvBench benchmark (Zou et al. 2023)





Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4, (Yong et al. 2023)

Combining different
 low-resource languages
 increases the jailbreaking
 success rate to ~79%

2

 High- or mid-resource languages are much better safeguarded


Attack	BYPASS (%)	REJECT (%)	UNCLEAR (%)
LRL-Combined Attacks	79.04	20.96	
Zulu (zu)	53.08	17.12	29.80
Scots Gaelic (gd)	43.08	45.19	11.73
Hmong (hmn)	28.85	4.62	66.53
Guarani (gn)	15.96	18.27	65.77
MRL-Combined Attacks	21.92	78.08	
Ukranian (uk)	2.31	95.96	1.73
Bengali (bn)	13.27	80.77	5.96
Thai (th)	10.38	85.96	3.66
Hebrew (he)	7.12	91.92	0.96
HRL-Combined Attacks	10.96	8	9.04
Simplified Mandarin (zh-CN)	2.69	95.96	1.35
Modern Standard Arabic (ar)	3.65	93.85	2.50
Italian (it)	0.58	99.23	0.19
Hindi (hi)	6.54	91.92	1.54
English (en) (No Translation)	0.96	99.04	0.00
AIM [9]	55.77	43.64	0.59
Base64 [51]	0.19	99.62	0.19
Prefix Injection [51]	2.50	97.31	0.19
Refusal Suppression [51]	11.92	87.50	0.58


Percentage of the unsafe inputs bypassing GPT-4's content safety guardrail LRL - low-resource languages, MRL - mid-resource languages

Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4, (Yong et al. 2023)

HRL - high-resource languages

Translating the unsafe prompts into lowresource languages bypasses the safeguards with a much higher success rate across all topics.







Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4, (Yong et al. 2023)

### **Computational Resources: Carbon Footprint**

#### **BLOOM 176B parameter model**

Trained on 1.6 terabytes of data in **46 natural languages** and 13 programming languages.

Total training time	118 days, 5 hours, 41 min			
Total number of	1,082,990 hours			
<b>GPU hours</b>	1,002,990 110018			
Total energy used	433,196 kWh			
GPU models used	Nvidia A100 80GB			
Carbon intensity	$57  \mathrm{cCO}_{\rm s}  \mathrm{callsWh}$			
of the energy grid	57 gCO <sub>2</sub> eq/kWh			

Key statistics about BLOOM model training




Estimating the Carbon Footprint of BLOOM, a 176B Parameter Language Model, (Luccioni et al. 2023)

### **Computational Resources: Carbon Footprint**

#### **BLOOM 176B parameter model**

Deployment and Inference: deployed to 16 Nvidia A100 40GB GPUs for 18 days.

With no incoming requests there is still ~0.28kWh of energy consumed.



Number of requests received in a 10-minute interval



Estimating the Carbon Footprint of BLOOM, a 176B Parameter Language Model, (Luccioni et al. 2023)

### Acknowledgement



The contributions of **Maram Hasanain** were funded by the NPRP grant 14C-0916-210015, which is provided by the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation).



### **Become Part of Our Team!**

Internships, Visiting Faculty Positions, Research Collaboration






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### **Thank You**



### https://llm-low-resource-lang.github.io/